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I. INTRODUCTION
Canadian corporate boardroom mythology has it that Al Gore's eloquence
and persuasiveness at the 1997 Kyoto Conference enticed Canada into signing an
unduly ambitious greenhouse gas ("GHG") emissions reduction commitment.
Canada agreed to a 6% reduction over 1990 levels, even though Canadian
negotiators lacked solid information on emissions and projections. At the time,
the commitment was quite serious, based on Canadian government leadership
aspirations dating from the 1998 Toronto Conference, an early landmark in
international climate-change policy development.
The result has been a policy-development fantasy, in which national climate
change planning began with little recognition of what was achievable, and
particularly what the 6% reduction target actually required. As Canadian
knowledge of GHG emissions improved, quantified reduction numbers became
more explicit, but achievability remained a question.
On July 16, 2005, the Canadian Federal Department of the Environment
published in the Canada Gazette a notice of intent to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions by Large Final Emitters ("LFEs")'. In the decade-long development of
Canada's climate change policy and strategy for meeting national obligations
under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and Kyoto Protocol,
this notice was the first clear signal that regulatory instruments would be central
implementation tools. To that point, nearly a year and a half after Canadian
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, climate change action had consisted of
voluntary industry and public programs, relatively small-scale federal
government direct spending and subsidies, and public information and education.
Why did the Canadian government labor for so long under the apparent
illusion that a policy based primarily on voluntarism and public education could
solve such a large environmental challenge? What prompted the rather late
adoption of an emissions trading system supported by a regulatory cap? And
what are these Large Final Emitters that find themselves squarely in the federal
government's regulatory sights?
This article assesses the law and legal process factors relevant to this
instrument choice. This article's thesis is that constitutional jurisdiction, or at
least federal-provincial relations perceptions of constitutional jurisdiction, played
a role. But two other factors were significant: (1) Canada's natural-resource-
intensive economy, in which the energy sector accounts for a significant and
growing proportion of GHG emissions; and (2) timing prescribed by the Kyoto
Protocol's first commitment period.
1. Dept. of the Environment, Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999: Notice of Intent to
Regulate Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Large Final Emitters, CAN. GAZErrE Part I, Vol. 139, No. 29, July 16,
2005, at 2489 [hereinafter "'LFE Notice of Intent"].
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To set the context, the next section looks at Canada's energy sector and its
prominence in the LFE group. Then, Canada's national climate-change strategy
is reviewed, beginning with its first steps in the late 1990s. The 2005 Climate
Change Plan,2 part of the broader environmental policy "Project Green," is
assessed against this course of climate change policy development. Provincial
climate change policy, particularly of major energy producer Alberta, is also
reviewed. The focus is on the proposed federal system for regulation of LFEs and
the proposed federal GHG emissions offset system. These programs are intended
to be the basis for Canada's GHG emissions trading scheme. Finally, a postscript
looks at the early policy direction signals sent by the new Canadian government
formed following the January 23, 2006, general election.
II. THE KYOTO "GAP"
In global terms, Canada's GHG emissions are not large, amounting to 2.2%
of global emissions.3
However, on a per capita basis, Canada ranks ninth among nations. Seventy-
three percent of total Canadian emissions are produced by fossil fuel combustion,
and the energy sector is responsible for 80.3% of overall emissions Between
1990 and 1999, the energy sector contributed 96.6% of the 91.4 Mt.6 increase in
total GHG emissions.7 However, over the same period, total Canadian GHG
emissions per unit of gross domestic product ("GDP") decreased, mainly as a
result of improved efficiency and fuel switching away from fossil fuels.8
Projecting emissions for the year 2020 reveals what has been described as the
"Kyoto Gap"-the difference between projected business as usual ("BAU")
emissions and Canada's Kyoto target of emissions 6% below 1990 levels. An
important factor in this projection is the prediction that energy use from all
sources is likely to double to approximately 750 exajoules in 2025.9 Canadian
officials acknowledge that this gap of approximately 36% -- or about 45% above
Canada's Kyoto target -- is the largest among Kyoto Protocol signatories.'0 The
2005 Climate Change Plan explanation is that "Canada has an energy intensive
2. Moving Forward on Climate Change: A Plan for Honouring our Kyoto Commitment, PROJECT GREEN
(Gov't of Can./Public Works and Gov't Serv., Ottawa), 2005 [hereinafter "2005 Climate Change Plan"].
3. Canada, Third National Report on Climate Change, 2001, at 23, available at http://www.climate
change.gc.ca (last visited June 3, 2007) [hereinafter "Third National Report"].
4. Id.
5. id. at 30.
6. One megaton (Mt) = one million metric tons.
7. Id. at 28.
8. Id. at 26.
9. Energy Needs, Choice and Possibilities: Scenarios to 2050, EXPLORING THE FUTURE (Shell
Int'l/Global Bus. Env't), 2001, at 60, available at http://www.shell.comstatic/media-en/downloads/scenarios.
pdf (last visited June 3, 2007).
10. 2005 Climate Change Plan, supra note 2, at 41 (discussing that the 45% gap is "being revised
upwards").
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economy due to a combination of factors that make it unique among
industrialized countries: a cold climate, large distance between population
centres, and Canada's resource-based economy.""
In 2003, the oil and gas and electricity generation sectors accounted for
36% of total emissions. Mining and manufacturing added 16% and
transportation a further 25%.' 2 Alberta, the major energy-producer province
accounted for just over 50% of the oil and gas and electricity generation
total, while the rest of Canada produced only 21% of these emissions. 3 These
energy sector's emissions are projected to increase by 64% between 1990 and
2010. According to Canada's Third National Report, "[th]is increase largely
reflects the growth in oil sands production and higher natural gas exports to
the United States that are anticipated~to occur during this period."'
4
III. LARGE FINAL EMITTERS -COLLABORATION AND VOLUNTARISM
Large Final Emitters are major companies in the energy, natural resources
and manufacturing sectors. They are responsible for a little more than 50% of
total Canadian GHG emissions. Beginning in the 1990s, before the Kyoto
Protocol, the government engaged these LFEs in a collaborative process for
emissions reduction. Initially, the focus was on voluntary measures, particularly
the Voluntary Challenge and Registry ("VCR")' 5 discussed below. LFEs became
the focus of a collaborative process involving industry, federal, provincial and
territorial governments, aboriginal peoples, environmental Non-Governmental
Organizations ("NGOs"), and citizens. Out of this long-running negotiation
emerged federal GHG emissions quantity and price guarantees for the energy
sector, and ultimately, the current federal GHG regulatory proposals discussed
below.
IV. THE CLIMATE CHANGE PLANS
A. Federal Plans
The first federal climate change plan in 2000 '6 was relatively nonspecific: it
pointed to the Kyoto Gap; outlined a series of existing, proposed, and voluntary
spending measures, including VCR; and proposed a variety of "targeted
11. Id.
12. Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, Climate Change: GHG Emissions by Sector, 2003.
13. J. Donner, Alberta Environment Strategic Directions, Alberta ENVIRONMENT, Feb. 5, 2002.
14. Third National Report, supra note 3, at 85.
15. VCR's background and organization is available at http://www.csa.ca/climatechange/services/
carbon/Default.asp?language=english (last visited June 3, 2007).
16. Canada's National Implementation Strategy on Climate Change, NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE
PROCESS (Gov't of Can./Public Works and Gov't Serv., Ottawa), Oct. 2000, available at http://www.nccp.com.
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measures." Building on this, the 2002 Climate Change Plan' 7 identified a 270 Mt.
target reduction and allocated this target to various sectors and programs.
An emissions-trading system was proposed, but little detail was included.
However, it was clear that LFEs had a major role to play in this trading regime.
Finally, the 2005 Climate Change Plan'" provided much of the detail of Canada's
overall approach. Significantly, the 2002 Plan places considerable emphasis on
demonstrating continuing commitment to targets, as well as approach and
specific quantitative commitments, such as those made to the energy sector by
the Prime Minister and the Minister of Natural Resources. These commitments
are specifically shown in a table that compares the 2002 Plan with the 2005
Plan.' 9
The 2005 Plan begins by adjusting the difference between Canada's
projected BAU emissions and its Kyoto target, which, according to the 2002
Plan, was 240 Mt. This is a consequence of "economic growth in key emissions-
intensive sectors... expected to be greater than had previously been projected., 20
"As a result the emissions gap is more likely in the area of 270 Mt. and could be
greater.21
Elements of the Plan include the following (with projected emission
reductions in parentheses):
" Market-based approaches, including the LFE system (36 Mt. reduc-
tion).
" A climate fund that will purchase domestic and international
emission-reduction credits on behalf of the Government of Canada
(75-115 Mt. reduction).
* A specific covenant between the federal government and the auto
industry (5.3 Mt. reduction).
Federal, provincial and territorial cooperation projects. A federal
Partnership Fund will, on the basis of government-to-government
cost-sharing agreements, support various subsidy programs for new
technology development. This includes clean-coal technology, CO 2
capture and storage, and electricity-grid coordination (55-85 Mt.
reduction).
Incentives for creation of beyond-BAU agricultural and forest sinks,
based on agricultural and forest practices changes. An offset system
17. Canada, Climate Change Plan for Canada, Nov. 2002, available at http://www.climatechange.gc.ca
(last visited June 3, 2007) [hereinafter "2002 Climate Change Plan"].
18. 2005 Climate Change Plan, supra note 2.
19. Id. at40-41.
20. Id. at 12.
21. Id.
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for greenhouse gases is under development. A consultation process,
based on papers that outline a system for offset creation and cer-
tification (discussed below) is underway (10-30 Mt. reduction).
Federal spending and tax incentives promoting renewable energy
technologies (15 Mt. reduction).
A voluntary "One Tonne Challenge" program aimed at individual
citizens (5 Mt. reduction).
Various federal spending programs, including energy efficiency and
promotion (40 Mt. reduction).
B. Alberta's Plan
Alberta's climate change plan was released in 2002.22 It has three major
elements: (1) an emission-intensity-based target of reducing emissions to 50% of
1990 levels by 2020, (2) voluntary (negotiated) reduction agreements with
specific sectors, including electricity, petroleum, transportation, and munici-
palities, and (3) an emissions trading system. The latter two are the main subjects
of the Climate Change and Emissions Management Act.23 Regulations under this
Act to implement targets under negotiated covenants, define emission rights and
their use to meet targets, and to establish reporting requirements, were under
development in May of 2006.
V. THE LEGAL REGIME
A. Funds and Subsidy Programs
Federal subsidy programs will promote renewable energy production,
particularly wind energy. Small hydro, biomass, and tidal power projects will
also be eligible for support. Tax incentives will also be used for these purposes.24
The Climate Fund Agency 5 is intended to serve both emissions-reduction
and technology-development objectives. As a purchaser of domestic emissions-
reductions and international Kyoto credits, it will stimulate the development of a
domestic emissions-trading system. It will partner with private sector firms in
emissions-reduction projects.
22. Albertans and Climate Change: Taking Action, ALBERTA ENV'T. (Gov't of Alberta, Edmonton, AB),
Oct. 2002.
23. Climate Change and Emissions Management Act, 2003 S.A., ch. 16.7 (Can.).
24. 2005 Climate Change Plan, supra note 2, at 20.
25. Id. The "Climate Fund" will be the Canadian Emission Reduction Incentives Agency Act, Part 14 of
the Budget Implementation Act, 2005, S.C., ch. 30 (Can.).
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A federal Partnership Fund,26 created as part of the 2005 Budget, will be a
basis for Memoranda of Understanding with provinces and territories to establish
cost-shared emissions-reduction programs and projects. The idea is to promote
changes in industrial and construction technology and infrastructure develop-
ment. Candidates include clean-coal technology, CO 2 capture and storage, and
phase-out of coal-fired electricity generation plants. It is expected that these cost-
shared initiatives may also be supported by the Climate Fund and the Technology
Investment Fund.
The Greenhouse Gas Technology Investment Fund, established by the
Budget Implementation Act of 2005,27 is another element of the federal strategy.
Beginning in 2008, contributors to the fund will receive Technology Investment
Units that LFEs can use to meet emissions targets. In line with the federal price
assurance to LFEs, 8 the maximum contribution rate for the first commitment
period will not exceed $15 per ton.29 However, these units will not be tradable,
and total units that can be counted toward emissions compliance will be limited
to 9 Mt. annually. °
B. Regulation of Large Final Emitters
1. Policy and Legislative Authority
Environment Canada's Notice of Intent to regulate greenhouse gas emissions
by LFEs is reasonably precise as to instrument choice and specific regulatory
method, but it is surprisingly uncertain about legal authority and timetable. It
begins by stating that the "working assumption"3' is that the proposed regulations
will be developed under Parts 5 and 11 of the Canadian Environmental Protection
Act ("CEPA")3 2 and will be administered by Environment Canada.
This signals that the legal regime will not be designed from the ground up,
but is likely to be tailored using existing CEPA powers. Part 5 is a system for
assessment, scheduling, and regulating toxic substances. This power is necessary
to establish legally enforceable emissions caps. Part 11 includes Cabinet powers
in the exercise of Part 5 powers to regulate systems for "tradable units,"
including testing and monitoring, description and the nature of tradable units
(baselines and maximum limits, conditions for participation in the system,
conditions for creation, sale and cancellation of tradable units, records, reports
26. Id. at 25.
27. Budget Implementation Act, 2005, S.C., ch. 30 (Can.). See LFE Notice of Intent, supra note 1, at
2497.
28. See infra Regulation of Large Final Emitters. See LFE Notice of Intent, supra note 1, at 2498.
29. All dollar amounts discussed in this article refer to Canadian dollars.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 2491.
32. Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, S.C., ch. 33 (Can.) [hereinafter "CEPA"].
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and forms, and a public registry).33 The Environment Minister has the power to
set conditions, suspend or cancel trading or invalidate trades where the Ministers
of Environment and Health are of the opinion that a trade has or may have an
immediate or long-term harmful effect on the environment, constitutes a "danger
to the environment on which human life depends," or "constitutes a danger in
Canada to human life or health."
An immediate issue arose concerning whether GHGs are "toxic" substances
within the meaning of CEPA Part 5. Debate briefly flared about whether the
word "toxic" is defined broadly enough for this purpose, but a ministerial order
adding GHGs to the toxic-substance list was made in November 2005, 35 and there
has been no challenge.
The reason for using existing legislative authority is that CEPA includes a
convenient mechanism for federal-provincial coordination of environmental
legislation. Where provincial laws are equivalent in terms of effect and include a
mechanism for citizen petitions for investigation of alleged non-compliance, the
federal and provincial Ministers can enter into an "equivalency agreement,"
36
which is the basis for an order by the federal Cabinet that effectively withdraws
operation of the equivalent CEPA regulations in the province or provinces.
This is the proposed mechanism for federal-provincial partnerships on a cap-
and-trade system for LFEs. Though not widely used, equivalency agreements
have been negotiated in other areas.37 They are an example of the collaborative
federalism approach that has come to characterize Canadian environmental
policy." All levels of government perceive that legitimacy requires more than
legislation presumptively grounded in constitutional competencies. Provincial
consent based on a reasonably transparent collaborative process has become
essential.3 9
a. Proposed Regulation-Making Process
Development of CEPA regulations has been proposed. A ministerial order to
add GHGs to the list of substances under Part 5 of CEPA has been made40 based
on the IPCC's Third Assessment Report.
33. Id., s. 326.
34. id., s. 327.
35. Order Adding Toxic Substances to Schedule I to the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999,
SOR/2005-345 s. 1 (Can.), Part II, November 21, 2005, at 2626 [hereinafter "Order Adding GHGs".
36. CEPA, s. 10.
37. E.g., Alberta Equivalency Order, SOR/94-752 (Can.).
38. D. VANNIJNATTEN, INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY MAKING: A
CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 23 (P. Fafard and K. Harrison eds., 2000).
39. W. MacKay, Legitimacy in a Federal System, I FEDERAL GOVERNANCE 27 (2003).
40. Order Adding GHGs, supra note 35.
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The Notice of Intent to Regulate emphasizes that this development will
involve federal-provincial partnerships and includes stakeholder participation and
other consultation.4' Equivalency agreements are intended to ensure national
consistency of the GHG emission targets. This is said to be necessary to protect
competitiveness among Canadian industries by "avoiding a patchwork of
different regulations being applied to the same industrial sectors and to ensure an
effective emissions trading regime. '42
"Drafting Instructions, Cross-Cutting Provisions for Large Final Emitters,"
posted on the CEPA Registry Web site, outlines regulations that will apply to
industrial sectors to be included (thus, "cross-cutting"). These include a
prohibition on emitting GHGs beyond limits determined by a prescribed formula,
requirements to demonstrate compliance by remitting compliance units to the
Minister of the Environment, and a provision for insurance of emission credits. 3
b. GHG Emission Targets
Targets will be prescribed for the 2008-2012 period, in emission intensity
terms, for activities in each sector. This means an allowed amount of GHGs
expressed in CO 2-equivalency per unit of output, with output defined for each
sector."
The method '5 for existing facilities will begin with the 2010 BAU forecast
and then determine percentage reductions. Fixed chemical reaction process
emissions will receive a zero reduction target. All other included emissions will
be assigned a 15% emission intensity target relative to the 2010 BAU
projections,46 but no sector will be burdened with more than 12% of total
reductions. Early action is credited because all facilities within a sub-sector
receive the same target, giving early investors in emissions reduction a
competitive advantage.47
For new, modified, or expanded facilities, the formula is familiar-the best
available technology economically achievable ("BATEA").4 8 This does not mean
41. LFE Notice of Intent, supra note I, at 2491.
42. Id. at 2492.
43. Environment Canada, Drafting Instructions, Cross-Cutting Provisions, Large Final Emitters Regula-
tions (2005), http://www.ec.gc.ca/CEPARegistry/documents/part/LFE-drft-inst/LFE-drft-inst.cfm [hereinafter
"Drafting Instructions"].
44. LFE Notice of Intent, supra note 1, at 2493; Drafting Instructions.
45. Id.
46. Letter from Federal National Resources Minister Herb Dhaliwal to the Canadian Association of
Petroleum Producers ("CAPP") in December 2002, and letter from Prime Minister Jean Chrrtien to CAPP in
July 2003, which gave assurances that Canadian Oil and gas production will not be made uncompetitive and
that the BAU base for emission targets will take future environmental regulations into account, http://www.
capp.ca (last visited June 3, 2007) [hereinafter "Dhaliwal Letter" and "Chritien Letter", respectively]. Both
letters are referred to in the LFE Notice of Intent, Annex 1.
47. LFE Notice ofIntent, supra note 1, at 2494.
48. Id.
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a requirement to install specific technology. The broader context is international
benchmarks, collaborative best practices, and the advice of a technical advisory
board. Thresholds for application of the regulation to small emitters will be
developed. The idea, according to the Notice of Intent, is to recognize the
"environmental and economic benefits [of] a capital stock life-cycle approach.
... ,,49 All of this target development will be done in the context of any
equivalency agreement negotiated with provinces and territories and in con-
sultation with industry and NGOs.
c. Offsets System
This is not part of the proposed LFE regulations, though creation and
purchase of offset credits, as one means of meeting targets, is likely to be of
interest to LFEs. As of 2006, a proposal for an offsets system was still in a public
consultation process.
Proposed is an offsets system ° much broader than the carbon reductions and
removals through land-use, land-use change, and forestry contemplated by
Articles 3(3) and (4) of the Kyoto Protocol."' Included are activities such as
electricity or gas utility demand-side management, landfill methane capture,
reforestation, carbon sequestration through low-till agricultural practices, and
geological sequestration of carbon. LFE activities that are outside LFE regulatory
requirements are also included.
The offsets system is not a minor program, since it encompasses all reduction
activities not included in the LFE system. It is intended that offsets will be
purchased by the Climate Fund and retired to meet Canada's Kyoto Protocol
obligation. The Fund will invest in both domestic emission-reduction projects
and the Kyoto Protocol international Clean Development Mechanism and Joint
Implementation projects.
2. System Design
The offset scheme involves four stages.52 First, application is made to an
Offset Program Authority for registration of a proposed GHG reduction or
removal project as an offset project. Second, it must be confirmed that
requirements for an offset project are met. These include specifications that
49. Id.
50. Offset System for Greenhouse Gases, Papers for Consultation: Overview Paper and Technical
Background Document (Gov't of Can., Ottawa), 2005, http://www.ieta.org/ieta/www/pages/getfile.Php
?doclD=1096 (last visited June 3, 2007) [hereinafter "Offset System Papers, Overview Paper" and "Offset
System Papers, Technical Background Document"].
51. U.N. Framework Convention of Climate Change, Marrakesh COP7 Report, Addendum, Part H:
Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties, Vol. 1, t54-63 U.N. Doc. FCCP/CP200I/13/Add.1 (Jan. 21,
2001 ), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a01 .pdf.
52. Offset System Papers, Overview Paper, supra note 50, at 2.
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reductions and removals be quantifiable and will achieve results within the
registration period. 3 Projects must be real, involving a specific and identifiable
GHG reduction or removal action. 4. They must be outside the LFEs system and
can be used only once in the national offsets regime. Third, emissions
reductions achieved by a project must be verified by the Authority.5 6 The fourth
stage is the issuance of the proper number of offset credits.
These credits will then be tradable in the domestic market and can be banked.
Most important, they can be created or purchased by LFEs and used to comply
with emission requirements, and they can be purchased by the Climate Fund.57
3. Ownership
Several legal issues for the offsets system are not yet resolved. One is
ownership of emissions reductions and removals. The proposal merely specifies
that a single person or entity must serve as project proponent. 8 In the case of
agricultural soil sequestration projects, the project proponent bears the burden of
clarifying ownership of soil sequestration potential and sequestered carbon. This
means that project proponents may be aggregators or investors who do not own
the land surface, even though it is likely that at common law, rights to
sequestration potential and carbon sequestered in agricultural land are part of the
fee simple absolute and thus normally vested in the surface owner; thus dispute
potential is high. 9 Consequently, certainty and stability of expectations suggest
the need for legislation to clearly specify the nature of ownership rights. 60
Another function of such legislation would be to establish templates for
contractual instruments to support sequestration projects on private and public
land.6 ' These instruments should, for example, clarify responsibility for
maintenance of the amount of sequestered carbon on which issuance of offset
credits is based, and replacement of offset credits should there be a sequestration
reversal.62 Otherwise, each sequestration project incurs significant transaction
costs related to the individualized design of contract instruments.
63
53. Id. at 6.
54. Id. at 7.
55. Id. at 8.
56. Id.; Offset System Papers, Technical Background Document, supra note 50, at 22.
57. 2005 Climate Change Plan, supra note 2, at 21.
58. Offset System Papers, Technical Background Document, supra note 50, at 8.
59. S. Kennett et al., Property Rights and the Legal Framework for Carbon Sequestration on
Agricultural Land, 37 Ol'rAWA L. REV. 171 (2006).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Offset System Papers, Technical Background Document, supra note 50, at 28.
63. Kennett, supra note 59.
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4. Dispute Resolution
A dispute resolution system tailored to the needs of the offsets system is not
part of the proposal. Yet without such a system, decisions of the Program
Authority, including ownership decisions and operating decisions on such
matters as certification of offset reversals, are subject to judicial review. Judicial
review leads to delay and uncertainty. There should be an internal review or
appeal mechanism with a related consensual dispute-resolution process to
minimize transaction costs, as well as promote system fairness and equity. 4
a. Emissions Trading System
The proposed LFE regulations do not address the structure of an emissions-
trading market. They merely specify the kind of emissions credits that can be
remitted for compliance purposes. The domestic offsets system will establish the
rules and conditions for creation and ownership of offset credits. The latter can
also be traded and used to meet LFE targets. Thus, together the LFE and Offsets
Systems create conditions for development of an emissions-trading system. In
addition to LFEs, governments, and individuals, the Climate Fund is likely to be
a major buyer. The market would operate through private-sector exchanges.
However, the government plans to establish an electronic registry and tracking
system."
b. Compliance Options
The result will be that various elements of the overall climate change regime,
including the LFE and Offsets Systems, the Technology Investment Fund, and
the various Kyoto Protocol mechanisms, may be used by LFEs to meet their
emissions targets. These options include the following:
" investment in direct emissions reduction
• domestic emissions credits purchased from other LFEs that have
surplus credits after achieving their targets
" domestic offset system credits
" non-tradable technology investment units as described above
* International Kyoto units, including Emission Reduction Units
("ERU"), Removal Units ("RMU"), Certified Emission Reduction
64. See A. Lucas & W. Daudu, Disputes and Dispute Resolution in the Offsets System, Apr. 2006,
BIOCAP Canada Research Integration Forum, http://www.biocap.ca; Tilleman, Environmental Appeals
Boards: A Comparative Look at the United States, Canada and England, 21 COLUM. J. ENvT L. 1 (1996).
65. LFE Notice of Intent, supra note 1, at 2497; Drafting Instructions, supra note 40.
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Units ("CER") and Assigned Amount Units ("AAU"). These units
must be "greened." 66
But for LFEs, the most important compliance instrument is a federal subsidy.
This is the $15/ton cap on the cost of compliance to which the federal
government committed in 2002.67 This price assurance will be implemented in
part through the Technology Investment Fund with its $15/ton investment units,
but total annual compliance from this source will be limited to 9 Mt. If additional
credits are required, options identified include special credits and direct subsidies
for emissions credit costs in excess of $15.68 Overall, the federal government
intends to stand firm on its commitment to LFEs that emission intensity targets
will not be more than 15% below projected BAU emission intensity levels in
2010.69 The limit on LFE responsibility will be implemented through the target-
setting process described above.
The LFE regulatory system necessarily involves prohibitions, including
failure to meet targets and reporting obligations. However, penalties will not
exceed $200/ton of emissions, and offenses are likely to include due diligence
defenses.0 Deliberate failure to comply will, however, be dealt with under
existing CEPA provisions that include potentially greater penalties.
c. Constitutional Powers
Legislative competence of the federal and provincial governments is a major
factor in the development of the LFE regime and the platform for emissions
trading. Sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act of 1867, 7' divide legislative
powers between the federal government and provinces in relation to listed
subjects. In the event of conflicts between federal and provincial legislation, the
federal law is paramount. 72 There is also a residual federal "peace, order and good
government ('POGG')" power. This power includes reasonably distinct and
indivisible matters of national concern that are not of a scale that unduly
diminishes exclusive provincial powers.77  No head of legislative power
specifically mentions environment. Provinces own the natural resources within
their boundaries.
66. For example, where surplus permits are purchased from Russia and Eastern European Countries
where economic decline has reduced emissions below Kyoto commitments, seller countries must agree to invest
sale proceeds in emissions reduction projects.
67. Dhaliwal Letter, supra note 46.
68. LFE Notice of Intent, supra note I, at 2498.
69. Dhaliwal Letter, supra note 46.
70. LFE Notice of Intent, supra note 1, at 2495.
71. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. ch.3 (U.K.) as reprinted in R.S.C., No. 5 (Appendix 1985).
72. Bank of Montreal v. Hall, 11990] 1 S.C.R. 121 (Can.); Multiple Access v. McCutcheon, [19821 2
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The problem is that provincial legislative competence must be taken
seriously in this "water-tight" compartment allocation of legislative power.
Generally speaking, the environment is a subject of shared competence.
Provincial property, civil rights, local works and undertakings, and public-lands
and natural-resources powers are set against the federal powers in relation to
fisheries, navigation, trade and commerce, federal public (including territorial)
lands, coastal marine belts, and Aboriginal lands . Because environment is an
aggregate subject, potentially ranging from human and ecosystem health, to
property, industrial operations and taxation, federal POGG power is by no means
clear. While there is little doubt that the federal power to raise money by "any
mode or system of taxation ' 76 would support a carefully crafted federal carbon
tax, the federal government explicitly, but informally, assured Alberta that it will
not levy a carbon tax.
Provincial climate change and emissions legislation establishing a regulatory
regime (including emission targets based on government-industry covenants that
form the basis for creation of tradable emission rights) is very likely
constitutionally valid.77 A similar federal regime is more problematic, particularly
if emissions targets are the subject of regulation,. Federal competence for a
scheme such as that proposed in the LFE notice of intent to regulate may
plausibly be based on the POGG power. The judicially recognized significance of
"provincial inability ' 7 in assessing the "singleness or indivisibility" of a subject
such as GHG emissions reduction strengthens arguments for federal competence.
But the Supreme Court of Canada has pointedly told the federal government to
use its enumerated competencies, such as the criminal law power, before
attempting to resort to POGG.79 In practice, even consideration by the federal
government of exercise of these competencies would be regarded by Alberta and
other provinces as a stinging political blow-a significant factor in a federation
that relies extensively on cooperative federalism processes and institutions. 0
Such federal action would be vigorously opposed, both judicially and politically.
This explains the federal strategy of cooperation, using negotiated
equivalency agreements under the CEPA. It is not so much a constitutional
constraint as a political constraint. It also assists in explaining the federal "no
carbon tax" guarantee, as well as the federal guarantees to the energy sector of
$15/ton price assurance and 15% of total emissions limit. All are political
accommodations that reflect historical jurisdictional battles, and current
74. PETER HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 29-19 (4th ed. 2004).
75. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., I S.C.R. 401.
76. Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91(3).
77. Nigel D. Bankes & Alistair R. Lucas, Kyoto, Constitutional Law and Alberta's Proposals, 42
ALBERTA L. REV. 355, 377, 397 (2004).
78. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., I S.C.R. 428 at 35.
79. R. v. Hydro-Quebec, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213 (Can.).
80. HOGG, supra note 74, at 5-43.
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perceptions about provincial and regional political and economic strengths in
light of the formal constitutional division of powers.
d. The Energy Imperative
In the 2005 Climate Change Plan, the Government of Canada acknowledges
the factors-cold, distance, and a resource-based economy-that create an
energy-intensive Canadian economy.8 ' The significance of natural resources,
particularly hydrocarbon energy resources, is implicit in the main features of the
Plan.
The Large Final Emitters System, with LFEs predominantly from the energy
sector, is a central component of the Plan. LFEs contribute a large percentage of
total emissions and, as noted in the 2005 Plan, makes them critical to Canada's
climate change effort.82 Further, a regulatory approach will provide LFEs a
platform to access both domestic and international emissions trading.83
It is in the elements of the LFE system that the importance of the energy
sector emerges clearly. The system features a number of financial supports. First,
there is the 15% of total emissions responsibility commitment, which caps LFE
financial responsibility for the first Kyoto commitment period. The government's
$15/ton emissions allowance price limit provides a more specific financial
assurance." Second, the 2003 letter from Prime Minister Chrdtien gave the
industry competitiveness support and removed a concern about potential double-
counting of emissions obligations, should more stringent federal environmental
regulations come into effect.85 The Greenhouse Gas Technology Investment
Fund, which creates opportunities for economic payoff through innovation that
energy sector firms are well-positioned to take advantage of, limits the investor
unit price to $15 per ton of GHGs. Third, there is opportunity, particularly for the
oil and gas sector, to lever provincial assistance through federal-provincial cost-
sharing programs supported by the federal Partnership Fund.
These features of the federal plan implement the emissions quantity and price
assurances that were given to the oil and gas sector in the period of national
controversy surrounding Canadian ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2002.
They also recognize and support the oil and gas industry development that is now
underway, particularly in the Alberta oil sands.
The economic implications of the oil sands are enormous for Canada. The oil
sands' reserve of 175 billion barrels of proven oil equivalent 86 place Canada in
81. 2005 Climate Change Plan, supra note 2, at Annex 3.
82. Id. at 17 ("...that there be certainty about the emissions reductions that will result from the LFE
system.").
83. Id. At 16-17.
84. Dhaliwal Letter, supra note 46.
85. Chrtien Letter, supra note 46.
86. OIL AND GAS JOURNAL, Dec. 2004; ALBERTA ENERGY AND UTILITIES BOARD, July 2003.
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the same league as Saudi Arabia. A frenzy of oil sands development, driven
largely by United States market demand and the relative security of North
American land-based pipeline delivery, is in progress. Projects either underway
or planned over the next two decades are valued at more than $100 billion
(Can.).87 Canadian Natural Resources Limited's recently commenced Horizon
mine and an upgrader project alone is projected to cost $10.8 billion (Can.).8 8 Oil
sands projects are now, and are likely to remain, Canada's most rapidly
increasing source of GHG emissions. 9
e. The Limits of Government-Industry Cooperation
Another factor evident in the development of Canadian climate change
policy over the last decade is the weakening and ultimate removal of voluntary
compliance initiatives as a central element of the federal climate change plan.
The government- and industry-supported Voluntary Challenge and Registry
("VCR" Inc.)9° became a major element of the national strategy and action
program for GHG reduction under the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change and the Kyoto Protocol.
But VCR was not among the instruments proposed in the 2002 National
Climate Change Plan. It was merely mentioned under "actions underway"9' by
LFEs. Under this plan, voluntary covenants, one component of the VCR scheme,
were to be used (with a "regulatory backstop") by LFEs to establish emissions
targets. 92 By late 2003, however, federal working papers did not mention VCR,
and covenants were to be used only to "vary" regulatory obligations for
companies likely to be competitively disadvantaged.93 In the 2005 Plan, even the
covenants were dropped as adding "considerable complexity to the system."
94
The reasons for the shift from voluntary to regulatory are simple: time and
money.95 First, as shown above, the size of the "Kyoto Gap" was seriously
underestimated. It became apparent that with the first Kyoto commitment period
looming, larger emissions reductions were required than experience with VCR
87. Gordon Page, An Oil SandsPrimer and Oil Sands Project, CALGARY HERALD, Oct. 21, 2005 at A-
20.
88. Id.
89. Third National Report, supra note 3, at 85.
90. VCR's background and organization is available at http://www.csa.ca/climatechange/services/
carbon/Default.asp?language=english (last visited June 3, 2007).
91. 2002 Climate Change Plan, supra note 17, at 29.
92. Id. at 30.
93. Natural Resources Canada, Large Final Emitters Group Discussion Paper: Overview of Legislation,
2004. This problem is recognized in the LFE Notice of Intent, supra note 1, at 2494. The BATEA-based
emissions targets are intended to be responsive.
94. 2005 Climate Change Plan, supra note 2, at 15.
95. A. LUCAS & V. POTES, REGULATING ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES 317 (B. Barton et al. eds.,
2006).
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suggested it could deliver. Both industry and government tacitly acknowledged 96
that regulation is the only viable instrument. A related factor is that the
expectation of industry, particularly the energy sector, changed as soon as it was
perceived that significant expenditures beyond BAU expenditures would be
required. At this point, the expectation was that if financially onerous
requirements were to be imposed, it must be done through formal regulations.
5. Prospects for the National Regime
What are the prospects for the federal-provincial partnership approach to
GHG emissions reduction? First, the CEPA equivalency agreement approach is a
viable means of removing constitutional uncertainty.97 But it requires, if not the
agreement of all the provinces, at least the agreement of the major energy-
producing and manufacturing provinces-British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario,
and Quebec.
Agreements in principle have been reached with Ontario and Quebec.98 The
latter recognizes, in the emissions target to be developed for Quebec, the
province's reliance on low-emission hydro-electric power. But federal negotia-
tions with Alberta have proven difficult. After initial signs of progress, Alberta
made threats of constitutional litigation.99 In 2006, while negotiations continue,
Alberta officials have made it clear that their priority is development of their own
GHG emissions regulations under Alberta's Climate Change and Emissions
Management Act.' °° The major objective is protection of the pro-vince's energy
sector, which is pumping massive royalty revenues into Alberta's public
accounts.'°'
Even assuming federal-provincial agreement, it seems likely that establish-
ment of LFE emissions targets under the scheme for new facilities will involve a
series of difficult negotiations. Like the regulations themselves, these BATEA
targets are to be developed "in partnership with provinces and territories and in
consultation with the industry ....
Another potential problem is that emissions trading may be slow to develop.
LFEs have the $15/ton price assurance and the availability at $15/ton (at least for
9 Mt. annually) of Greenhouse Gas Technology Investment Fund credits. With
this comfort and the likelihood of room for initial cost-effective direct emissions
96. Important notice concerning the transition of VCRs programs over the course of 2004 is available at
http://www.csa.ca/climatechange/services/carbon/Default.asp?language=english (last visited June 3, 2007).
97. Bankes & Lucas, supra note 77, at 398.
98. R. Sguin, Quebec buries Kyoto hatchet with Ottawa, GLOBE AND MAIL, Nov. 24, 2005, at A15.
99. D. Bueckert, Alberta is poised to battle Ottawa over Kyoto Treaty Plan, GLOBE AND MAIL, Nov. 2,
2005, at A 18.
100. R. D'Aliesio, Alberta Renews Kyoto Battle, CALGARY HERALD, Nov. 23, 2005, at Al.
101. Producing multibillion-dollar budget surpluses that support programs such as the $400 "prosperity
bonus" for every Alberta resident: Alberta Resource Rebate Statute Amendment Act, Bill 43, 2005.
102. LFE Notice of Intent, supra note I, at 2495.
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reduction, as well as initial uncertainty concerning international emissions
credits, it seems likely that LFEs will not rush into the market. In the early
market, the Climate Fund is likely to be the major, and perhaps the only,
purchaser of domestic offset credits and surplus LFE emission credits.
6. Potential NAFTA Constraints
The establishment and operation of a domestic GHG emissions trading
regime raises potential issues under the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA") and the wider World Trade Organization ("WTO") regime. For
example, allocation of emissions credits that favors domestic over non-domestic
firms in ways that create competitive advantages may be infringements of
NAFTA and WTO national treatment and most-favored-nation provisions. 3 The
Framework Convention on Climate Change and Kyoto Protocol are not among
the multilateral environmental agreements specifically given priority in the event
of inconsistency by NAFTA's Article 104. NAFTA's Chapter 11 investment
provisions create special investor discrimination rights that must be respected.
These include rights to compensation for loss resulting from government
measures that are "tantamount to ... expropriation" of investments. Chapter 11
may encompass rights of U.S. and Mexican firms to enter and actively participate
in a Canadian emissions trading system.
Detailed analysis of these and other potential trade law issues created by
Canada's proposed Kyoto Protocol implementation regime is beyond the scope
of this paper"'O However, the Canadian federal LFE and Offsets System
proposals do not contemplate selective allocation of emissions credits through
establishment of emissions targets. No distinction will be made among Canadian
firms, Canadian subsidiaries of U.S. firms, and any other non-Canadian firms in
either LFE target-setting, credit allocation and trading, or in offset credit creation
and trading. Though international Kyoto credits will be recognized in the trading
system, non-Kyoto party credits have no place. Potentially, failure to recognize
credits generated in non-Kyoto states, such as U.S. credits, is trade-restrictive.
However, it has been argued'0 5 that even if this were accepted, there is a problem,
because acceptance of non-Kyoto credits by Kyoto states would not be in accord
with the Protocol.
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V.. CONCLUSION
Canada's climate change plan will deliver emissions reductions through
technology investment and federal-provincial partnership subsidy programs. But
regulating the LFEs to anchor an emission trading system is more problematic.
Notwithstanding the lift resulting from the success of the 1lth Conference of the
Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change and First Conference of the
Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, held in late 2005
in Montreal and chaired by Canada's Environment Minister, Stdphane Dion,' °6
obstacles remain to implementing Canada's own GHG emissions-reduction regime.
There is serious risk that equivalency agreements cannot be negotiated with all
provinces, particularly Alberta. Without this federal-provincial cooperation,
unilateral federal regulation would be required, and this would be constitutionally
uncertain. In the larger picture, the challenge for Canada is to achieve the necessary
emissions reductions while continuing to support development of a high-emission oil
sands-based energy sector.
A. Postscript: Policy Signals from the New Minority Conservative Government
The climate change policy of Prime Minister Stephen Harper's minority
Conservative government, formed following the January 2006 general election,
remains unclear. Environment Minister Rona Ambrose and other federal officials
have said repeatedly that Canada will not withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol, but will
develop a new national approach that involves provincial collaboration'0 7 and does
not rely on purchase of international Kyoto emissions credits.'0 A number of the
2005 Climate Change Plan subsidy programs have been cut.' °9 There has also been
speculation about Canadian involvement in the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean
Development and Climate, an agreement that includes the United States and a
number of Asia-Pacific region countries. "°
Meanwhile, Ms. Ambrose has assumed the presidency of the Conference of the
Parties that is faced with the task of negotiating the next greenhouse gas emission
reduction commitment with the Kyoto Protocol countries. As of May 2007, the new
national climate change plan remains under development.
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